The One Child Policy and Family Formation in Urban China by Gordon Anderson & Teng Wah Leo
University of Toronto 
Department of Economics 
 
August 06, 2009
By Gordon  Anderson and Teng Wah Leo
The One Child Policy and Family Formation in Urban China
Working Paper 367The One Child Policy and




St. Francis Xavier University
23 November, 2008
Abstract
In 1979 the Chinese government implemented the One Child Policy in an attempt
to ameliorate the potential negative economic implications of population explosion
on their 
edgling economy. This article examines the consequences of this policy
on marital matching and family size decisions. Using a simple General Equilibrium
model, we rst show how constraining marital output on the quantity of children
raises the marginal benet of increased positive assortative matching, and greater
investment in children. The theoretical prediction on increased positive assortative
matching is examined and armed using a Distributional Overlap Test which in-
volves comparison of the joint density of spousal educational attainment and was
applied to the urban population of six Chinese provinces. To examine if the policy
was indeed binding, Poisson regressions were employed and provided evidence that
the One Child Policy principally aected the quantity of children decision and sup-
pressed parental preferences over their child's gender, suggesting that births beyond
the rst child are to a considerable degree accidental among younger mothers who
were younger than 25 years of age when One Child Policy was legislated.
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11 Introduction
One of the most controversial and far reaching population control policies in recent history
is China's One Child Policy (OCP). Introduced in 1979 the OCP represented a consid-
erable intervention in the household choice process, implemented with nes and various
other forms of coercion it encouraged families to limit production of ospring. Such an
intervention could have changed fundamentally the nature of both existing and antici-
pated marriage arrangements and can be expected to have in
uenced family formation
decisions in many dimensions, for instance in the choice of partner, the family size and
investments in children. As such it provides a natural pseudo experiment within which
the nature of family formation choices can be examined. Our examination will be studied
within the context in which the policy was engendered.
Firstly, there is a sense in which the desired outcome of the policy was not at odds
with the background against which it was introduced. Fertility (number of live births
per married woman aged 20-44) was already in considerable decline prior to the OCP
having fallen to 2.2 in 1980 from 6.4 in 1965. This phenomenon could be rationalized as a
result of urbanization1 which reduced the preference for larger families (Therborn 2004),
and consequently imply that the policy might not be binding among the urban populace,
which we will verify.
Granted that prior work had found that the OCP had enforced a binding constraint
on family size (Zhang 2002), the policy was introduced in tandem with the Economic
Reforms of 1979 with the ensuing well documented increase in wealth to the populace.
Should this increase in wealth have the propensity to bring about a similar change in
observed matches, we would not be able to discern between the eects from these two
policies. Further, within the premise of a binding policy we would also have to contend
with the apparent preference for sons in China the expression of which, facilitated by the
development of fetus gender detection and selective abortion, have generated a somewhat
skewed sex ratio at birth (Therborn 2004)2. An argument for this preference is that
within a patriarchal society, patrilocal residence of married sons is much more common
1In 1949 7.3% of the population was urbanized, however by 1990 20.1% was urbanized (Anderson 2004)
2Therborn (2004) suggests that the decline was related to the increasing possibility of the number
(and gender) of children being a matter of choice with the development and spread of contraceptive and
fetus gender detection techniques. Usually boy/girl sex ratios at birth are around 105/100, in China in
1995 the ratio was 117/100 (Peng and Guo 2000)
2than matrilocal residence, implying hence that sons provide considerable old age security
benets for their parents as opposed to daughters. This gender bias in the sex ratio would
have implications on the types of matches observed as well.
With regard to the decline in family size prior to the OCP the demographer J.C.
Caldwell developed a theory which has a distinctly economic 
avor (Caldwell 1982). His
view was that fertility was high when children are an asset to their parents and low when
they become a liability, although empirical verication of the idea encountered diculties
\...the marginal value of each extra child is impossible to determine..." (Caldwell et
al. 1982). Becker (1993) formalized this in developing models where both number of and
quality of children and the quality of partners feature as part of the household decision
process. Becker's model can be used to rationalize the eect of urbanization and the
preference for sons at birth. An important feature of Becker's analysis is that \quantity"
and \quality" choices are to some degree simultaneous, with each in
uencing the other to
an extent3. He demonstrates that while quantity and quality are likely to be substitutes
they cannot be close substitutes (because the budget constraint between quantity and
type is convex, equilibrium would not exist if the indierence curve between quantity and
type were in some sense \less" convex).
We provide in this paper a simple static general equilibrium model of marital matching,
where choice of a spousal match is dependent on the individual's measurable continuously
distributed attribute or quality as well as the consequent choices in child quality and
quantity should the marriage take place. This approach allows us to examine how a
binding constraint on child quantity(Neary and Roberts (1980); Deaton (1981)) or family
size decision aects spousal choice endogenously. Intuitively, if individuals on both sides
of the marriage market are forward looking, the policy will aect the choice of partner
decision by rendering the owner of childrearing attributes less of a comparative advantage
relative to someone with income generating attributes all other things equal. Put another
3Family formation has most frequently been discussed in the economics literature as an adjunct to
the study of female labor supply, the issue being whether fertility should or should not be an argument
in the labor supply equation. To some extent this hinges upon the nature of the planning horizon. One
culture in developing female labor supply models is to assume that lifetime fertility decisions are made
early in life, \at marriage is the most popular choice" observes Browning (1992). An alternative culture
is to assume a simultaneous model where attempting to have more children and supplying more female
labor supply decision. Here we abstract from the labor supply decision and focus on the realized family
outcomes of child quantity and quality.
3way, if all women have the same capacity for childrearing, the individuals may become
more inclined towards being careful with regards to the potential spouse's attribute(s).
The empirical approach in this paper dier from recent work in the empirical matching
literature (such as was adopted by Choo and Siow (2006) who used a dynamic transferable
utility model and as suggested by Dagsvik (2000)) but builds on the empirical literature
in mobility measures (See Dardanoni (1993), Maasoumi (1996), Quah (1996), Shorrocks
(1976), and Shorrocks (1978)) and stochastic dominance measures (See Anderson (1996),
Atkinson (1970), Bourguignon and Fields (1997), Davidson and Duclos (2000)). This pa-
per provides a simple and easily applied statistic with which to measure the proximity be-
tween an empirical joint density in the matched individual's attribute and that generated
by a hypothesized matching scheme, such as positive or negative assortative matching.
Further, the statistic is mean invariant and asymptotically normally distributed, which
facilitates inferences.
The data is drawn from an urban survey of six provinces in China over 1989 and 1991
to 2001; Shaanxi, Jilin, Hubei, Sichuan, Guangdong and Shandong4. The spousal choice
is considered in terms of the cohort of males and females by year of birth. Specically,
we divide the sample into 3 cohorts, the rst with couples whose oldest spouse in the
marriage was born between 1940 and 1949, the second cohort from 1950 to 1959, and
the last from 1960 to 1969. In the sample, the rst child was born to families when the
mother was about 25 years of age, thus the rst cohort would consists of families whose
spousal choice would have been made prior to the OCP, while the latter cohorts would
have made it's spousal choice after the OCP. Sorting is considered to take place over the
educational attainment of partners where attainment is integer indexed from 1 to 5 with 5
being college graduates and above, 4 being individuals who obtained technical education,
3 being high school, 2 being middle school, and 1 being primary school and lower. We
nd that there is signicant suggestive evidence of a tendency towards increased positive
assortative matching in the latter cohorts which is not explained by matching trends.
To show that the quantity of children decision is due to the OCP and not a natural
tendency resulting from urbanization and economic growth we performed Poisson regres-
sions. Since the objective is to study those households which had completed their family
4These data were obtained from the National Bureau of Statistics as part of the project on Income
Inequality during China's Transition organized by Dwayne Benjamin, Loren Brandt, John Giles and
Sangui Wang.
4size decisions, we focused on households whose mother's are over the age of 25. To exam-
ine choice dierentials induced by the OCP, the sample was segmented into mothers who
were 25 and younger when OCP was legislated and mothers who were older than 25 in
1979. Corroborating with the evidence from matching, we found that births beyond the
rst child among young mothers when the OCP was implemented were purely accidental.
In the following, Section 2 formulates a simple model and develops some comparative
statics for the various family formation decisions. Partner choice decisions are examined
empirically in section 3, and child quantity and gender decisions are examined in section
4. This paper ends with a brief discussion and conclusion in section 5.
2 A Simple Model
The objective of the model is to provide us with some comparative statics with which
we can understand how the OCP and Economic Reforms might have directly aected
matching within the marriage market through individual preferences in their potential
spouse. As will be observed, the empirical techniques used, which compares how the joint
density of spousal characteristic concur with a hypothesized joint density under positive
assortative matching, is mean and variance invariant. Consequently, the model examines
how the bounds on an individuals preferred set of spouses tighten or slacken as a result
of the OCP and Economic Reforms.
Consider a model where an individual lives for 2 periods, one as a child, and one as
an adult. At the beginning of the adult period, agents choose to marry or remain single
(there is no divorce in this model)5. The rate at which an adult meets someone of the
opposite gender is random. Marriage is dependent on the type of male and that of their
potential spouse and utility is assumed transferable. Let the subscript h denote a husband





, and distributed with density f(:) and distribution F(:) for both men and
women. If they nd a match, they will then choose the number of children to have and
5The focus is on gains from marriage and how it aects matching and child investment decisions thus
without loss of generality we solve the problem from the perspective of men, apportioning all the rents
from marriage to them. The imposition of other sharing rules will not aect the essence of the results
presented below.
5the amount of investment in each child. The aspect of utility derived from children is
described by a function q dependent on the type of parents, the number of children, and
the amount of investment per child, q  q (th;tw;k;n), where q 2 0 + R+ is increasing
and concave in all it's inputs. The other aspect of a married individual's utility is derived
from personal consumption. We assume that utility derived from child consumption and
own consumption to be multiplicatively separable, uh = q (tw;n;kjth)ch . If instead the
individual chooses to remain single, utility will only be derived from personal consumption
which in turn is dependent on his/her own type as well, si = max
ci
ci, i 2 fh;wg.
Income realization of the family or individual is assumed to be dependent on the type
of match and the individual's type respectively. Specically, family income is assumed
to be yx(th;tw), and income for a single individual to be yv(ti), i 2 fh;wg, where y is
the average income within the economy, x : (th;tw) 7! f0g + R+ and v : ti 7! f0g + R+.
This setup thus abstracts from redistributive concerns arising from policy. Further, this
formulation of income together with the range of q ensures that for some matches and
individual types, the choice to remain single will be made. That is the set of single
individuals by type is non-empty.
The following functional assumptions are also made,
Assumption 1 : Investment in children, k, and the choice of the number of children,
n, are substitutes in the function q(:), which parents derive from having children in their
marriage. That is qk;n(tw;n;kjth)  0.




, i 2 fh;wg.
Assumption 3 : (Complementarity of Types) uti;tj  0, i 6= j, i;j 2 fh;wg.
Further, let t = arg max
tw2[t;t]
u(tw;n;kjth) , t = th = tw, for th;tw 2 ft;tg .
Assumption 4 : (Convex in Types When Single): vti  0, vti;ti  0, i 2 fh;wg.










Assumption 1 creates the tradeo between the choice of investment per child, and the
number of children in a family. Assumption 2 ensures that ui(:) i 2 fh;wg is well behaved
on the support of the agents' type. Assumption 3 says that given an agent's type, they
6would prefer to be matched with someone of the same type or better. Together with
assumption 4, this ensures that agents would always prefer to match with someone closer
to their own type, since the concavity of ui(:) i 2 fh;wg in own type and the type of
spouse, and the convexity of v(:) in own type ensures that gross marital output attains
a maxima for agents of a suciently low type on the support. An example of a function
that would meet these assumptions is when q(:) and x(:) are quadratic functions with
respect to (th   tw) on th;tw 2 [0;1]6.
On the other hand, assumption 5 pertains to the eect of income on preferences in
the marriage and single state and its implication is depicted in gure 1. It ensures that
utility gained from marriage increases at a faster rate with respect to income than in the
single state. Put another way, it says that once an individual nds marriage desirable
at his current income realization, an increase in his permanent income will not reduce
his desire to be married. This assumption negates the possibility of the existence of a
upper income threshold where the individual reverts to a preference for remaining single
at higher income realizations, or in other words the utility from marriage and being single
can intersect at most once.
Abstracting from intra-household bargaining and focusing on the total value of marital
output, without loss of generality the solution to the individual's problem will be solved
from the perspective of the man choosing a prospective wife.
2.1 Single Man






where y is the average income of all individuals within the economy, and v : ti 7!
0 + R+;i 2 fh;wg. Then an individual i's income is described by the product of v(ti),
i 2 fh;wg and y, which means that his income is a proportion of the average income,
6We suspect a model with search costs that fall as agent types rises may generate similar results we
present below.


































u(y + y)   s(y + y) > 0
dependent ultimately on the his type. The optimal consumption choice is that the indi-
vidual spends all his income on herself ci = yv(ti). Let the utility of this single individual
be.
b si = yv(ti)
2.2 Married Man
If the individual nds a suitable match and chooses marriage, he solves the following
problem subject to his budget constraint and the participation constraint in order for his





ch + cw + nk  yx(th;tw)
q(tw;n;kjth)cw  yv(tw)
8where ch, and cw, are the consumption choices, and th and tw are the types for the husband
and wife respectively.
By the usual non-satiation argument, the budget constraint holds with equality, and
since the husband can always make himself better o by just meeting the participation










q(tw;n;kjth)(yx(th;tw)   nk)   yv(tw)

















where k and n are the optimal values for investment per child, and number of children





However, under a situation where n is no longer a choice variable, only (2) would prevail
hence changes in n on the optimal choice of k can be examined as if n is a parameter. For
the rest of the paper, let n = e n be for cases where the number of children is exogenously
determined and let the respective optimal choice of investment for each child be k0 there.
2.3 Comparative Statics
The OCP in China coincided with the Chinese Economic Reforms in 1979 which precip-
itated considerable economic growth. Should the impact of economic growth on familial
choices yield similar outcomes to the OCP, it would not be possible to identify the sep-
arate policy eects. This section examines the impact derived from both policies on
9quantity and quality of children, followed by spousal matching decisions. The following
four propositions relate to how the OCP and economic growth might have aected spousal
and family size choices (proofs are supplied in an appendix).
First, let b uh = max
n;k
q(tw;n;kjth)(yx(th;tw) nk) yv(tw) and b sh = yv(th), then a type
th man's second period utility is,
Uh = maxfb uh;b shg
The reservation type of his potential spouse is determined by





w)   nk)   yv(t
R
w) = yv(th) (3)




w(th), from gure 2 it may be observed that (3) determines only
the lower bound of the reservation at point A. For spousal types below tR
w, although he
may be collecting all the rents, he obtains no net benet from marriage. It is only above
tR
w that marital utility would exceed his utility from remaining single.
Men of a suciently low type may have an upper bound on the type of his spouse,
tR
w, beyond which the marital gains from the match may not be sucient for him to she
obtains at least s(tR
w), in other words the utility she would otherwise get from remaining
single. This upper threshold is determined by
q(tR
w;n;kjth)(yx(th;tR
w)   nk)   s(tR
w) = b sh = yv(th) (4)
The upper bound is point B in gure 2. The type of woman that would present as the
optimal spousal type occurs when the marginal gain in gross marital utility from choosing
a higher type spouse equates with the marginal increase in cost he would have to pay to
meet her participation constraint. This is depicted on the diagram where the slope of
the gross utility and yv(tw) equates. Beyond this optimal type, his own marital gains
start decreasing, and fall below his value of remaining single eventually. Note that by
construction, tR
w  th  tR
w.
Intuitively, given that quantity and quality of children are substitutable, a binding
policy that impinges on a family's choice in one dimension should yield an increase in the
remaining dimension which is stated in the following proposition.
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b sh = yv(th)
b u(tw;k;njth)
b u(tw;k;njth) + s(tw)
A B
Proposition 1 : An exogenously enforced reduction in the number of children raises
equilibrium investment in children.
Yet the success of the Economic Reform of 1979, which raised the income, and con-
sequently the quality of lives among the Chinese populace, should similarly raise familial
investments in children, assuming children are \normal goods". That the reform came
at the same time as the OCP, would accentuate the increase in investments (holding the
nominal cost of investments constant), and consequently child quality.
Proposition 2 : An exogenous increase in income would increase the number of children
born into the family and the level of investment per child.
Propositions 1 and 2 implies that the OCP and Economic Reform of 1979 would have
reinforced each other, preventing identication of the true cause of changes in investment
in children if any, should the impact of the OCP be considered solely from the perspective
of child outcome. However the manner either policy could have eected spousal choices
11can also be examined. Intuitively, spousal choice remains a venue through which individ-
uals could adjust to the enactment of the OCP to maintain the gains to marriage. Child
outcomes are dependent on both ongoing investment as well as genetically endowed qual-
ities from their parents. Thus the exogenous imposition or rationing of child quantity via
the OCP could have also accentuated the importance of good spousal match, assuming
positive assortative matching is the norm. It should be noted that we are not disput-
ing the existence of positive assortative matching, but posit that the degree of positive
assortative matching may have been altered.
Proposition 3 : When the number of children is xed below the optimal choice that a
married couple would have chosen given their types then:
1. for all men, the lower bound on the reservation type of a prospective spouse would
rise, while the upper bound would fall, and
2. agents who choose to marry would exhibit increased assortative matching.
Intuitively we may partition the types of men into three broad groups, those who
would always prefer not to marry (L), those who benet from marriage, but who would
never be able to attract high type spouses relative to their own type (M), and those who
are coveted by all spousal types (H). Each of these is depicted in gure 3.
Figure 4 shows how a binding family size policy might aect choice of spousal type.
Intuitively, with a binding family size policy, matches with lower type women yield lower
marital output in the post policy regime, consequently shifting the lower bound on the
reservation type closer to one's own type. On the other hand, a match with a higher type
does not yield sucient gains to marriage for the man to oer the minimum utility to
attract the potential spouse. This process is depicted as a fall in u(tw;k;njth(H)) for a
man of type th(H) from a situation where he was capable of attracting spouses of higher
types, to one where he would not be able to do so under the new regime. For a suciently
low type agent, this may even mean a complete withdrawal from the marriage market as
shown in gure 4, in the fall of u(tw;k;njth(M)) for a man of type th(M). The latter
observation is re
ected in the following corollary.
Corollary 1 : A binding Family Size Policy which reduces the number of children born
into a family reduces the marriage rate for all types of men.
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On the other hand economic growth, by raising disposable income, could potentially
slacken the need for a good spousal match. However, at the same time, economic growth
may have also raised the gains to remaining single, thereby reducing the merits of mar-
riage. These possibilities are examined in the following propositions.
Proposition 4 : An increase in y, the average (real) income in the economy, leads to
the following:
1. for all men, the lower bound on the reservation type of a prospective spouse would
fall, while the upper bound would rise and,
2. agents who choose to marry would exhibit decreased assortative matching.
The intuition to proposition 4 is as follows; if at the status quo on the margin of spousal
type, the man is indierent to marrying or remaining single, an increase in income available
to him cannot make his potential spouse any less attractive. However, if it makes her more
attractive, by increasing his utility, the marginal prospective spousal type at the lower
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bound must fall, while the upper bound must increase. (This outcome is facilitated by the
assumption that an increased average income within the economy has no redistributive
eects, so growth results in a shift of the entire distribution to a new mean income level,
while maintaining its shape). The corollary below follows:
Corollary 2 An increase in average income increases marriage rates.
Assume that each individual meets one and only one potential spouse, in their lifetime,
so that if a man meets a women within the bounds of a potential spouse, he will marry
her. Therefore the probability of marriage for a man of type th is P such that,
P = Pr(t
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It is clear that P 2 [0;1]. Let there be a unit mass of male and female agents. Then the





























Since it is clear that M 2 [0;1], the market clears.
The model has explicitly argued that the two venues through which matching in the
marriage market could have been directly aected were through the constraining of family
size due to the OCP and the increase in income as a result of the Economic Reforms of
1979. It is worth discussing the other possible venues through which both policies might
aect matching, at least conceptually.
A possible indirect eect that may aect matching in China via the Economic Reforms
is through the altering of the returns to education. Essentially as the gains to human
capital investment increases, the marriage market would see changes in the composition
at various educational attainment levels, that is the marginal distribution of educational
attainment for both sides of the marriage market will be altered. This would necessarily
alter the probability of an individual meeting her potential spouse over the entire range
of potential spouses in the marriage market but not the choice set itself which is what
this paper examines and attempts to measure. Put another way, eects on returns to
education (which is typically measured by monetary gains) does not aect the marital
utility from matching with a particular spousal type, but the probability of matching
with that spousal type. Further, it can be said that the OCP has a similar eect as well.
Consider the following argument, with the implementation of the OCP, parents would be
cognizant of the binding constraint that a binding family policy would have on the gains
to marriage. Given that a \good" marriage entered into by their children would raise
their utility, it is in their interest to ensure that the gains to marriage does not suer
(See Peters and Siow (2002) for a model on premarital investments in children). This
would then raise their premarital investment in their children, giving rise consequently to
a stochastic dominant shift in the educational attainment of child outcomes in the post
15OCP cohorts. However, like before this process aects the marginal distribution of types
across both sides of the marriage market, but not the preferences of individuals.
Granted that the above eects are themselves of interest for a complete understanding
of the eects of the OCP and other policies in the intervening periods, they do not fall
within the stated objective of this paper which is to examine the change in matching
preference through the examination of empirical joint density with that generated by a
null hypothesis of positive assortative matching.
3 The Overlap Measure and Empirical Strategey
We will next describe the overlap measure which will be used to examine the degree of
overlap between the empirical joint density of spousal attributes against that which would
be generated by positive and negative assortative matching. This will be followed by a
description of the dataset and the identication strategy.
3.1 Measuring the Degree of Assortative Matching
3.1.1 The Elements of a Matching Matrix
To assess the change in matching behavior via the relationship between the respective at-
tributes of a pairing, the joint density of the attributes of spouses are compared with what
could have emerged under a perfect positive (negative) assortative scenario. Anderson et
al. (2008) provide a matching index which makes such a comparison.
To illustrate the use of the measure, suppose the type space of both husbands and




ig where i 2 fh;wg and t1
i < t2
h < ::: < t5
h. If this type partitions are
matched such that Pr(th = tk
h) = Pr(tw = tk
w) for all k 2 f1;2;:::;5g, letting the row index
denote the male type partitions and the columns denote the female type partitions, then
the joint density under a null of perfect assortative matching is of the form,
Jp =
2
6 6 6 6
4
Pr(ti = t1
i) 0 ::: 0
0 Pr(ti = t2
i) ::: 0
: : ::: :
0 0 ::: Pr(ti = t5
i)
3
7 7 7 7
5
(6)
16On the other hand, it may not always be possible to partition the support of types such
that the above joint density matrix is derived (particularly when the realizations of types









w) for m 2 f1;2;::;5g, that is men stochastically
dominate women in the type measure. Then a possible realization of the joint density
matrix assuming oers are made by men, and that higher type men can always outbid
lower type men for a potential match (as in the model) could be of the form,
Jp =
2
6 6 6 6 6
4
Pr(th = t1
h) 0 ::: 0 0
Pr(th  t2
h)   Pr(tw  t2
w) Pr(tw  t2
w)   Pr(th  t3
h) ::: 0 0
0 Pr(th  t3
h)   Pr(tw  t3
w) ::: 0 0
: : ::: : :
0 0 ::: Pr(th = t5
h)   Pr(tw = t5
w) Pr(tw = t5
w)
3
7 7 7 7 7
5
(7)
Although we report only the results using the above estimated matrix, there are other
methods of arriving at the positive and negative assortative matching matrix which were
examined as well, namely when the oers are made by women to men and when the
preference for own type is strongest (that is matching clears the diagonal rst)7. We
found that the method suggested by the model, where oers are made by men to women,
and that higher type men can always make higher transfers to women of all types, yields
the greatest overlap measure with the empirical joint density, and consequently allows us
to better examine how matching on the dimension of educational attainment has changed.
3.1.2 The Overlap Measure and its Asymptotic Distribution
The idea is that the matrix consistent with positive assortative matching should exhibit
concentration of mass in the cells along the diagonal. This implies that the examination of
proximity to complete positive assortative matching can be performed by comparing the
degree of concurrence of the joint density matrices of Jp constructed from the marginal
densities under the null against the empirical joint density, just as in the case of indepen-
dence or contingency table tests. Specically, let the elements of the joint density matrix
generated by the null hypothesis be j
p
i;k, and that for the empirical joint density by je
i;k,
where i;k 2 f1;2;:::;ng, n being the number of mutually exclusive type realizations for
7This results are available upon request from the authors
17both married men and women. The measure of the overlap between theoretical and em-
















This overlap measure is asymptotically normally distributed and changes in the measure



















7 7 7 7 7
5
(9)
where m;n, m 2 f1;2;:::;Mg and n 2 f1;2;:::;Ng, is the true probability of event m;n



















 = I   vv
0 (11)
Then by the results in Rao (1973) pages 383 and 391, Anderson and Leo (2008) and
Anderson et al. (2008), we have
V
a ! NMN (0;
) (12)
8For complete negative assortative matching, we work in a similar fashion, where the joint density
matrix Jn under the null hypothesis of negative assortative matching is a counter-diagonal matrix, where
the highest type individuals match with the lowest type from the other gender. In the perfectly matched
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18Dene the matrix of estimated probabilities as J, and let j = vecJ and  = vec where


























where i is a vector of ones. Let jp and je be the vectorized joint density under positive
assortative matching and the empirical counterpart respectively. Dene jmin = minfjo;jeg.
Likewise, let p and e be the corresponding vectorized true probabilities (from vecp and
vece respectively), and let min = minfp;eg. Then the Overlap Index is OVp = i0jmin.
It is clear then asymptotically by equation (14),
OVp := i
0j








































Note that the variance-covariance matrix can be estimated by replacing vmin with jmin.
The attractive feature of these indices is that they can be readily applied when the
transition matrices are not square and can be implemented in multivariate domains. Fur-
ther, since they are asymptotically normally distributed, they facilitate inferences about
trends toward dierent matching patterns.
3.2 Empirical Strategy and Data Summary
The samples that will be used includes all years, including 1989, 1991 to 2001. The pooled
sample is divided into three cohorts of individuals based on the birth year of the men, so
that a couple is classied as belonging to the 1940s cohort if the husband is born between
1940 to 1949, likewise for the 1950s and 1960s cohort. This classication follows from our
assumption that oers are from men.
Table 1 summarizes some of the characteristics of married couples within our sample.
First note the unanimous fall in the number of children over the decades, and particularly
19among the 1960s cohort. In addition, note the increase in educational attainment over the
decades which may be due to increased returns to education with the economic reforms, or
it could be from increased investments in children by parents as discussed prior, or simply
due to the regime shift from pre- to post cultural revolution China. What is interesting is
that the de
ated income (following (Brandt and Holz 2006)) fell between the 1950s and
1960s cohort in all provinces with the exception of Guangdong, and Sichuan (Noting the
large income disparity between Guangdong residents and those in the other provinces.).
In so far as a fall in income implies increased positive assortative matching, the key
province to understanding how matching is aected by the family size intervention due to
the OCP is principally with the matching outcome in Sichuan province. What occurs in
Guangdong is an empirical question dependent on how strong the eect due to the OCP
is relative to the eect of increased negative assortative matching with increased income.
It is not possible to identify if the increased assortative matching in the other provinces is
a result of the OCP or the Economic Reforms. All we will be able to ascertain for those
provinces is whether there is a rise of fall in positive assortative matching.
Table 2 reports the results for a simple pure Poisson regression performed on the
couples in our sample. The primary rationale of separating the sample into the three
cohorts is that the rst two would provide information on the trends in spousal matching
across time, while the third cohort of the 1960s is the sample most likely to be aected
by the OCP. The rst order eect of the OCP is to reduce the demand of children,
consequently it may be conjectured that the choice of whether to have any additional
children after the rst child is likely an accident, which underlies the Poisson model. The
rst three columns are for the three cohorts without discerning between whether the rst
child in the family had a male or a female child. The second three records the results
when the rst child is a male, while the nal three columns are for when the rst child is
a female.
Note that we cannot reject the pure Poisson model in the general case for Shandong,
Hubei and Sichuan, implying that in general the birth of a second child among the 1960s
cohort are \accidents". What is interesting is that with the exception of Shandong and
Shaanxi, all subsequent births after the rst male child are likewise \accidents", but that
this is no longer true when the rst child is a female unanimously 9. Overall, the results
9The question of gender selection is a question the authors are currently examining
20suggests that the latest cohort of the 1960s are subject to the OCP, and justies our
subsequent interpretation that any change in the 1960s cohort is due to either the eects
of the OCP or the Economic Reforms.
The extent to which the OCP in
uenced partner choice decisions depends upon the
degree to which positive or negative assortative pairing was the prevailing mode prior to
the inception of the policy and how it changed after the policy. The comparative statics
predict an increase in the incidence of positive assortative matching (decrease in negative
assortative matching) with the onset of the OCP, in the sense that the range of values of
a particular characteristic one is willing to entertain in a partner has narrowed around his
own characteristic. It also predicts a drop in the marriage rate. However these predictions
need qualication in terms of the supply and demand conditions the matchers confront in
the sense that they are always predicated on the availability of partners with whom the
agents wish to match.
Table 3 summarizes the distribution of types by gender and province for married
individuals in the three birth cohorts. Together their spousal choices would straddle the
implementation of the OCP, permitting an examination of changes in spousal choice as
suggested by the model in section 2. Specically, the 1940s cohort would be the strictly
pre-policy cohort, while the 1960s cohort would be the strictly post-policy cohort, with
the 1950s cohort straddling the policy period10. The empirical analysis will be performed
by province, that is we assume that each marriage market is closed within provincial
boundaries11.
10Since the age of individuals born in the 1950s would be between the ages of 20 to 29 when the OCP
was implemented.
11We are however unable to control for the specic urban centers within which the individuals reside,
given that this information is not available to us.
21Table 1: Summary of Parental Characteristics
Province Variable 1940s Cohort 1950s Cohort 1960s Cohort
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
Jilin Number of Children 1.3547 0.8333 1.1550 0.4618 0.9904 0.2753
Father's Education 3.1818 1.3794 3.1741 1.1636 3.4738 1.1559
Mother's Education 2.7004 1.2614 3.0165 1.0724 3.3311 1.0927
Father's De
ated Income 3.3699 1.7024 3.3078 1.9084 3.2119 2.0461
Mother's De
ated Income 2.1289 1.6142 2.2913 1.4792 2.2849 1.6536
Observations 1342 2723 1661
Shandong Number of Children 1.4867 0.7726 1.1478 0.3971 1.0182 0.2585
Father's Education 3.1128 1.3216 3.3286 1.2541 3.8288 1.1336
Mother's Education 2.5531 1.2518 2.9259 1.1048 3.3512 1.0745
Father's De
ated Income 3.5644 1.6691 3.5727 1.7539 3.5542 1.7107
Mother's De
ated Income 2.6945 1.5580 2.9859 1.6184 2.9939 1.6225
Observations 1206 2970 1922
Hubei Number of Children 1.4012 0.7608 1.1157 0.4023 0.9927 0.2229
Father's Education 3.1812 1.3377 3.2202 1.2133 3.7847 1.1258
Mother's Education 2.5248 1.2449 2.8931 1.0500 3.3681 1.0865
Father's De
ated Income 3.2900 1.7657 3.2999 1.8086 3.2164 1.7962
Mother's De
ated Income 2.5619 1.3983 2.8155 1.5873 2.7784 1.6565
Observations 1649 3397 1649
Guangdong Number of Children 1.5875 0.7460 1.1696 0.4427 1.0152 0.3327
Father's Education 3.0413 1.4145 3.2011 1.2509 3.6340 1.0717
Mother's Education 2.4732 1.2586 2.9261 1.0687 3.3612 1.0666
Father's De
ated Income 8.8553 6.5393 8.7790 5.7751 10.4256 6.9291
Mother's De
ated Income 5.9568 4.1463 7.5356 5.5621 8.4583 6.5500
Observations 1549 2760 1254
Sichuan Number of Children 1.0647 0.7603 1.0133 0.3501 0.9744 0.2563
Father's Education 3.1247 1.3725 2.9652 1.3065 3.6205 1.1736
Mother's Education 2.5109 1.2525 2.7036 1.0942 3.3821 1.1050
Father's De
ated Income 3.3728 1.6817 3.1531 1.6387 3.2847 1.9944
Mother's De
ated Income 2.3651 1.5338 2.5850 1.5302 2.8064 1.6850
Observations 2165 4514 2308
Shaanxi Number of Children 1.3491 0.8425 1.1680 0.4827 1.0118 0.3199
Father's Education 3.2498 1.2991 3.2704 1.2642 3.6171 1.1439
Mother's Education 2.6821 1.1480 2.8971 1.0208 3.1988 1.0151
Father's De
ated Income 3.0547 1.5524 2.7700 1.4807 2.7042 1.7256
Mother's De
ated Income 1.9925 1.3553 2.1742 1.3066 2.0294 1.4101
Observations 1249 1827 1016











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































23As observed in table 3, the marginal distributions reveal that the educational attain-
ment of men dominate that of women as it was in table 1. It is then to be expected
that if marriage is indeed benecial, well educated men in the earlier birth cohorts may
adapt through lower incidences of positive assortative matching choices12. As educational
attainment rose among the general populace, the possibility of increase positive assor-
tative matching would have increased among men with higher educational attainment.
This upward trend in educational attainment is however quite separate from the eect
of the OCP on familial investments in children, nor can it be attributed to the economic
reforms since the agents were born of parents in an era prior to 1979. Nonetheless to
account for the changes across time, the relative changes amongst these three cohorts of
individuals is examined to ascertain the eect of the OCP. It should also be noted that
since both the OCP and Economic Reforms had dierential impact provincially, it would
not be surprising to see dierential in matching patterns, since it would largely depend
upon the relative strengths of the policies (the OCP or Economic Reforms).
For each province, comparisons of the change in matching between the cohorts (1940s
versus 1960s, 1940s versus 1950s and 1950s versus 1960s) allows us to examine the trends
in matching. This is done through the examination of the overlap between the empiri-
cal density matrix to that expected under positive (negative) assortative matching. The
overlap provides a scalar measure (which is asympototically normally distributed) and it
is the dierence between these measures for each cohort which will allow us to under-
stand how matching has evolved. A detailed description of the measures utilized will be
described in detail in the following section. In the absence of any trends towards positive
assortative matching (possibly as a result of preference for smaller family sizes due to
urbanization), changes in the matching pattern could be due to either the OCP or Eco-
nomic Reforms. However, should there be a \linear" trend towards positive assortative
matching, the eect that is due to the OCP or the economic reform can be gleaned from
examining the dierence in the measures from two comparisons, 1940s versus 1960s, and
1950s versus 1960s, which is similar to a dierence-in-dierence analysis. As was noted
in the introduction, the sorting attribute we examine is educational attainment whose
classication is based on the pre-1986 eight year compulsory educational system since the
youngest set of individuals in our sample, those born in 1969 would have completed their
12Due to a lack of data, we are also unable to discern if the individuals were married in rural towns
prior to being observed within the urban context.
24compulsory education prior to the institution of the new educational laws 13.
Overlap amongst the male and female attainment distributions (the sum of the min-
imums of the male and female proportions in each attainment category) is a measure of
the degree to which exact positive assortative matching that is feasible (i.e. all males
of type 1 matches with female of type 1, all males of type 2 match with female of type
2, etc.). Examining this stylized measure yields an indication of the degree of positive
assortative matching that is feasible. Such a overlap measure for each province and the
three cohorts are respectively; Jilin was 0.8146, 0.9204 and 0.9320; Shandong was 0.8333,
0.8494 and 0.7907; Hubei was 0.8069, 0.8775 and 0.8210; Guangdong was 0.8447, 0.8740
and 0.8403; Sichuan was 0.8278, 0.8865 and 0.8705; and Shaanxi was 0.8241, 0.8149 and
0.8109. Comparing the potential for assortative pairing between the cohorts born in the
1940s and 1950s, there was an increase with the exception being Shaanxi. On the other
hand, when comparing between 1950s and 1960s, there is infact a decrease in potential
with the exception of Jilin. This suggests that should we nd a signicant increase in
assortative pairing between the 1950s versus the 1960s cohorts, it is very possible that it
is a result of the OCP, without regard to trends towards positive assortative matching.
13China implemented a nine year compulsory educational system, divided into primary (ve to six
years) and junior secondary (3 to 4 years). Upon completion, the children may then attend senior





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































264 Empirical Analysis of Matching
The empirical joint densities of the data are reported in Table 4, from which we can
glean some information on matching patterns over the various cohorts by province of
residence. Note that the diagonal probabilities of the joint density provide some evidence
of increased assortative pairing between the cohorts born in the 1940s and 1950s which is
not surprising given the capacity for assortative matching has increased between the two
cohorts (In other words, the comparison between this two cohorts is akin to examining the
marital eects due to the cultural revolution between 1966 and 1969.). What is interesting
is that this was also true among provinces where capacity for positive assortative pairing
for the 1960s cohort decreased. Closer inspection of the marginal densities in table 3
reveals that the fall in capacity is largely due to a decreased proportion of low educational
attainment individuals, while the increases in positive asortative pairing among the 1960s
cohorts are among individuals with higher educational attainment realizations. Further,
note that as predicted by the model, the lower rates of matching among individuals
of low attainment, that is individuals with elementary, and middle school education.
Nonetheless, this evidence is suggestive, and will serve only as a guide in our subsequent
analysis.
The corresponding indices and tests for positive and negative assortative matching
using the overlap measure are reported in Table 5. It must be noted that because the
1950s cohort consists of mainly individuals who made their spousal choice prior to the
implementation of the OCP, while the 1960s cohort were those most likely aected, the
identication of the impact of the OCP hinges on the increase in assortative pairing by
the 1960s cohort over the other two cohort.
We test for the increase in positive assortative matching by testing rst,
vs:
H0 : OVp > 0
H1 : OVp  0
and decreased negative assortative matching,
vs:
H0 : OVn < 0
H1 : OVn  0




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































29From table 5 note that in all instances, the overlap measures are all statistically sig-
nicantly dierent from complete overlap, and that the empirical joint density is a closer
match to the positive assortative joint density matrix than that generated by negative
assortative matching. Next, examining the change in assortative matching between the
1940s and 1950s cohort, note that the hypothesis of increased positive assortative match-
ing, and decreased negative assortative matching cannot be rejected for Shandong, Hubei,
Guangdong, and Sichuan. For Jilin and Shaanxi, it seems there is an increase in both pos-
itive and negative assortative matching, noting that the empirical joint density is closer
to positive than negative assortative matching. Considering the fact that the capacity
for positive assortative matching rose between the two cohorts, the outcomes are not
surprising and can easily be explained as the eects of increased educational attainment
in the general populace, and a trend towards increased positive assortative matching.
However, comparing the 1950s and 1960s cohorts, note the signicant increase in positive
assortative matching but statistically insignicant change in negative assortative match-
ing for Jilin, Hubei, Sichuan and Shaanxi. For Shandong, there is a signicant increase in
positive assortative matching and a signicant decrease in negative assortative matching,
while Guangdong recorded a signicant increase in both positive and negative assortative
matching, with the overlap with positive assortative matching joint density being higher.
Similar conclusions can be made when comparing the 1960s and 1940s cohorts. This then
suggests that there was indeed a signicant increase in positive assortative matching in
the 1960s which, negating considerations of trends, coupled with the decreased capacity
for positive assortative matching suggests that this is a consequence of the OCP (or that
the OCP eects dominate that due to the Economics Reforms).
To control for the eects of trends from increased preference for positive assortative
matching in urban China, we perform a dierence-in-dierence analysis which is done
by examining the relative change in overlap measure between two comparisons which are
reported in table 5 as well. Given that with the exception of Shaanxi, all other provinces
had experienced an increase in capacity for positive assortative matching from the 1940s
to the 1950s cohort, we can test whether the increase in positive assortative matching
between the 1950s and 1960s cohort is signicantly greater than that between the 1940s
and 1950s which would control for trends towards increased preference for positive assor-
tative matching. This comparison is reported in the rst comparison of the nal panel of
Dierence-in-Dierence. Note that in this comparison, Shandong, Hubei and Sichuan all
30experienced a signicantly higher rate of increase in positive assortative matching between
the 1950s and 1960s cohorts. In terms of the change in negative assortative matching,
these three provinces' fall are signicantly less than that exhibited between the 1940s and
1950s cohorts. Nonetheless, realizing that the change a negative assortative matching for
Hubei and Sichuan between the 1950s and 1960s is not statistically signicant, the results
thus suggests that the increase in positive assortative matching is a result of the OCP. The
conclusion is further enforced by noting that the average de
ated income (summarized in
table 1) over the three cohorts has not seen signicant variation for this three provinces.
On the other hand, the results for Guangdong and Shaanxi suggests that positive
assortative matching has slowed down signicantly. One possible reason is principally due
to the lower capacity for positive assortative matching for Guangdong and Shaanxi among
the 1960s cohort. For Guangdong, with reference to table 1, there is the added evidence of
increase in income (a fth of a standard deviation) between the 1950s and 1960s cohorts,
suggesting that the fall in positive assortative matching there might also be tempered
by the income eect suggested in the model of section 2. For Jilin, the only province in
our sample that exhibited continued increase in positive assortative matching capacity,
much of the increase in positive assortative matching seem to have been exhausted by the
arrival of the 1950s cohort such that the increase in positive assortative matching is lower
than that observed between the 1940s and 1950s cohort. This suggests that for Shaanxi
and Jilin, the dominating eect that drove the change in positive assortative matching is
simply due to trends (in post cultural revolution China), or urbanization.
It is of interest to compare the dierence in overlap between the 1960s versus the 1940s
cohort, and 1960s versus the 1950s cohort. We know that for Shandong, Guangdong, and
Shaanxi there was a decline in capacity for positive assortative matching between the
1940s and 1960s cohort. While Jilin, Sichuan and Hubei saw in increase in capacity for
positive assortative matching, the change in capacity was far smaller than the dierence
between the 1960s and 1950s cohort. This means that we should expect the rate of change
in positive assortative matching should be greater for all the province in the 1940s versus
1960s comparison than the 1960s versus the 1950s comparison. This result is the second
comparison of the nal panel. Note that for all the provinces unanimously, the increase in
positive assortative matching over 1940s and 1960s was instead larger than that exhibited
between the 1950s and 1960s.
The nal comparison of the nal panel reports the dierence between the change
31between the 1950s versus 1940s, and that of the 1960s versus the 1940s. Given the change
in capacity, there is little to be gleaned regarding trends, and the results accords with
expectations that the latter dierence in overlap is greater since the eect is dominated
by the change in capacity over the 1940s and 1950s. Note however that the dierence is
not signicant at the 5% level for Jilin, Guangdong, and Shaanxi, further suggesting the
likelihood that the change in matching behavior in the 1960s cohort is in fact dominated
by the eects of the OCP. On the aggregate, the evidence substantially supports the
hypothesis that the OCP altered individual's spousal choice.
5 Stochastic Dominance Test
The model of section 2 suggests that for the OCP would induce an increase in positive
assortative matching. For the higher type individuals, this increase occurs with a reduc-
tion in the likelihood of the individual choosing the \lowest" type individuals as partners,
which in turn implies that there may be a stochastic dominant shift in the cumulative
distribution of spouses (Appendix A.2 discusses this in greater detail). For the lower
educational attainment realizations, the stochastic dominance relationship is a empirical
question. This section examines the relationship of the cumulative distribution of spouses
for each educational attainment men, and compares these cumulative distributions across
cohorts for each province as before.
Let F(:) and G(:) be the conditional distribution of spousal type of husbands before
and after the OCP respectively, and similarly let f(:) and g(:) be their conditional density












) F(twjth)  G(twjth) (17)
If the above inequality is true for tw 2 [t;t], we say that F rst order stochastically
dominate G up to t, and we can write this as f
1
 g, and more generally for the i'th order
of stochastic dominance, we write f
i
 g for tw 2 [t;t] when
F
i(twjth)   G









32Relating to the discrete educational attainment realizations (see Dardanoni and Forcina




F(tw = tkjth)   G(tw = tkjth) =
k X
i=0
(f(tw = tijth)   g(tw = tijth))  0 (19)
First order dominance simply means that the cumulative density of f is everywhere to
the right of the cumulative density of g. In the present context, the rst order dominance
of F over G implies that the proportion of wives at or below attainment level tw = tk is
always greater than or equal to the corresponding proportion of wives of husbands after
the OCP.
Unlike comparisons of means an essential feature of dominance comparisons is that
they compare the whole distribution of attainments. However unlike indices, which pro-
vide complete orderings, stochastic dominance orderings are not complete in that distri-
butions cannot always be ranked at a particular order (because the inequality cannot be
maintained for all k or the distributions are not signicantly dierent from one another).
One feature of stochastic dominance rankings is that f
i
 g implies f
j
 g for all j > i.
As noted prior, since we are concerned with the general trend towards increased pos-
itive matching, we need to discern between the eect due to the OCP and that of ur-
banization. In other words, we would also wish not only to test for ith order stochastic
dominance, but also dierence in dominance as in the last section14. Since the measure
is asymptotically normally distributed as well (Davidson and Duclos 2000).
14From the model of section 2, it may be discerned that for suciently high type individuals, the
distribution of spousal type of the higher type individual should likewise stochastically dominate their
lower type peers. In which case the ith order stochastic dominance relationship can be written as,









for th > t0
h, and where F(:) and G(:) are the respective conditional distributions of men of type th and
t0
h. The comparison of the evolution of this relationship across cohort is however not predicted by the
model since it is dependent on the rate of the tendency towards positive assortative matching by each
type. Nonetheless, this empirical exercise was likewise performed and the results are available from the
authors upon request. This test examines the dominance of dierences (
i
) testing whether the gap
between two types is closing or widening across cohorts/time. Alternatively put, it is a test of whether
33Table 6 presents the conditional cumulative density (F(:) is the rst item for each
wives' educational attainment), and cumulative distribution (F 2(:) is the second item for
each educational attainment) of spousal educational attainment conditional on husbands'
attainment level for each of the three cohorts and province (attainment level 5 for wives
is omitted since it would sum to the same value regardless). Table 7 presents the rst
and second order stochastic dominance tests of the later over the earlier cohorts, for the
dominance of the wives' attainment distribution given husbands' attainment level at each
of the wives' educational attainment realization. The rst two elements reported for each
of the wives' attainment is the dierence and p-values (in brackets) for the rst order
dominance test, while the third and fourth element reports that for the second order
dominance test. Negative dierences support the hypothesis of dominance of later over
earlier cohorts, so for a dominance conclusion at least one signicantly negative statistic
is sought with no signicantly positive entries in a given row.
The rst interesting result is that according with expectations, for men of the two
highest attainment levels (university and technical education), there is indeed a rst order
stochastic dominance relationship for all provinces of later over earlier cohorts with the sole
exception of Shandong (with the distribution of the 1960s and 1950s cohort intersecting
at the attainment level of technical education. For the other male attainment levels
the relationship of dominance cannot is true not for all realizations of spousal attainment
levels which accords with expectations. Intuitively, although the lower reservation type for
males in all attainment levels is higher, but so too is the upper reservation type lower. For
lower type males, there is in eect a shrinkage in prospective spouses, and the dominance
relationship realized is dependent on whether the eect of the higher lower reservation
is greater than the lower upper reservation spousal type, and the respective marginal
distribution of desirable spousal types, and the competition of men of higher type. In
addition, note that this conclusion is true for both rst and second order dominance
tests.


















8tk 2 ft1;t2;::;;tKg, and where f and g are the respective density functions of men of type th and t0
h, and
the subscript 1 and 2 denote two diering time periods or cohort. Test statistics and their distributions for




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































39As in the examination of the overlap in joint densities it is informative to examine
the degree of change between the dierences across cohorts to discern between the eects
due to the general trend towards greater positive assortative matching versus that due
genuinely to the OCP. Table 8 presents tests of the dierence across cohorts, in other
words it is a dierence-in-dierence examination. Of interest particularly is the the result
for the higher attainment levels. The rst column for each male attainment is for (60s-
50s)-(60s-40s), the second column is for the dierence (60s-50s)-(50s-40s), and the last
column is (60s-40s)-(50s-40s). If the linear trend is the change exhibited between the
1960s and the 1940s, then the reference column is the rst, while if the trend is that
between the 1950s and 1940s cohort, then it is the second column that is of interest. The
objective is to then examine if the change between the 1960s and 1950s cohort is larger
then that of the trend.
Examining the result for the rst column, a denitive conclusion can only be made
for the spousal distribution of the highest type males where if the linear trend is the
change in stochastic dominance relationship between the 1960s and 1940s cohort, the
results suggests that there is a signicant change in the behavior of males in the 1960s
vis- a-vis their 1950s peers (with the exception of Shandong). However, the sign of the
change implies that the stochastic dominance shift in spousal choice for the highest type
males have slowed down. This is not surprising since as we have found in the previous
section, there is a decline in capacity for positive assortative matching over the decades
for all the provinces with the exception of Jilin. Next observe that if instead we examine
column two, the change in stochastic dominance relationship is not particularly clear
with the exception of Shandong where it reveals that the stochastic dominance shift is
signicantly greater than the trend suggested by the dierence in distribution of the
1950s and 1940s cohort. Similarly, for all the other male attainment levels, the change
in dominance relationship is vague according with expectations. The principal reason for
the ambiguity of results here is that by comparing the conditional distributions we do
not gain a complete picture of what is occurring across the entire market. Nonetheless,
the key prediction from the model regarding the change in the marginal distribution of
spousal educational attainment for men of the highest level is armed.
406 Conclusion
It is well known that contributions to total marital output have several dimensions, and
when one dimension is exogenously constrained below the private optimal choice, couples
may circumvent those restrictions by changing choices in other dimensions. Here the
consequences of the imposition of the One Child Policy on the general Chinese populace
in 1979 have been examined in the context of a simple model of family formation. The
model predicts that a binding constraint on the number of children a family can have
increases the incidence of positive assortative matching and investment in child quality
since the constraint raises the marginal benet from both.
The matching predictions were examined via a Overlap Measure by comparing married
individuals by birth cohort, where the older cohorts would be constituted by individuals
unaected by the OCP, and the younger cohorts are more likely to be aected. The sep-
aration of the sample into the the three cohorts from the 1940s, 1950s and 1960s, and the
interpretation of the 1960s cohort as the OCP cohort is also supported by the fact that
their family size choice was signicantly dierent from their predecessors. The results in-
dicate that given an individual's type, here proxied by educational attainment or training,
individuals are more likely to match with another of similar attainment as a consequence
of the OCP. The robustness of the result was examined across the cohorts where it was
determined that the increase in positive assortative matching among individuals in the
1960s cohort were the stronger than would have been predicted by trends created by the
Economic Reform of 1979 and that due to urbanization. Further, the result was in the
face of declining capacity among the populace for positive assortative matching among
the 1960s cohort.
We also examined the change in the distribution of the distribution of the educational
attainment of wives'. As suggested by the model, it was found that for the highest at-
tainment men, the distribution of their wives' attainment stochastically dominated their
predecessors from the earlier cohorts even after controlling for trends towards increased
positive assortative matching. As predicted by the model, there is no discernible sys-
tematic change in the distribution of wives' attainment among men of lower attainment
levels. This is due to the fact that the comparison of the distribution ignores the eect
that other men's choices have on each other in the marriage market, and is not surprising.
41The model also predicted that if the OCP was binding, there would be an increase
in the investments in children. This then suggests diminishing intergenerational mobility
in China which was found to be true in a companion paper. Taken together, the results
suggests that the OCP has had a strong familial eect within the urban context. We have
also found indications of gender preference among some parents, as noted in section 3. It
is of interest next to understand how the spousal choice might have aected investments
in children endogenously, and the prevalence of gender selection in urban China, which is
the subject of our future research.
42A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Propositions
Proof. Proof of Proposition 1: Let k0 be the optimal level of investment per child with




qne n + q + qnk0   qkn (yx   e nk0)
qkk (yx   e nk0   qke n   qne n)
 0 (A-1)
Given assumption 1, a binding constraint on the number of children, i.e. one that is lower
than what the parents would have chosen, would increase investments in children.












(qkk (yx   nk)   2qkk)
 0 (A-3)
Therefore, an increase in income would increase the number of children in the family, and
the level of investment per child.
Proof. Proof of Proposition 3: For the proof of point 1, dierentiating tR
w in (3) with





qk0   qe n(yx   e nk0)
qtR




Where k0 is the optimal choice of k given tw = tR
w, th and e n. Since e n is binding from
below, by revealed preference the marginal benet would be greater than the marginal
cost, and the numerator is non-positive. By assumption 3, and tR
w  th, the greater the
type of an individual, the greater the gains to marriage, so the denominator is positive.
For the upper bound on the reservation value, we dierentiate tR
w in (4) with respect





qk00   qe n (yx   e nk00)
qtR




Where k00 is the optimal choice of k given tw = tR
w, th and e n. The numerator as before
is non-positive. By assumption 3, and tR
w  th, the denominator is negative, and point 1
follows.
43Since there is a narrowing in the range of potential matches around the agents type,
incidences of assortative matches rise. Formally, let a man of type th be matched with













































































Proof. Proof of Proposition 4: As in the proof of proposition 3, dierentiate tR
w and tR
w












First note that by assumption 3, and tR
w  th, the greater the type of an individual, the
greater the gains to marriage, so the denominator is positive. Secondly, by assumption 5,












By assumption 3, and tR
w  th, the denominator is negative. By assumption 5, the
numerator is negative, and the inequality follows. The rest of the arguments are similar
to proposition 3.
44A.2 Discussion of Stochastic Dominance Comparative Statics
Let j(th;tw) be the joint density function of a man of type th and a woman of type tw
being matched with each other. Further, let the density function of married men and
women be m(:) and w(:) respectively. Then the conditional density of women matched
with men of type th is
j(th;tw)
m(th) = f(twjth). By our previous discussion, the joint probability
function of the match changes with the OCP. Denote the pre- and post-policy conditional
joint probability by f(twjth) and g(twjth) respectively.
Next note that by proposition 3, for th = t, assuming M > 0, that is probability of








f(twjth = t)   g(twjth = t)
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f(twjth = t)   g(twjth = t)
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f(twjth = t)   g(twjth = t)
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w are the lower reservation type of spouses for men of type t pre- and
post-policy. The inequality implies that for men of type th = t, the OCP leads to a rst
order stochastic dominance shift in the distribution of spousal type. This is true in fact
for a larger set of male types.
With the assumption that the marriage market clears with M > 0, by continuity of
types for th 2 [t;t], there exists a e th = minfth 2 [t;t] : t = minftR
w(th);tgg. Let e tf
and e tg be the threshold of types for men pre- and post-policy, then by proposition 3,
e tf  e tg, which implies that the set of individuals for which the OCP leads to a stochastic
dominance includes at least men of type th 2 [e tg;t]. Finally, note that rst order stochastic
dominance implies higher order stochastic dominance.
However, the rst stochastic dominance relationship pre- and post-policy for all other
types of men is ambiguous. To see this consider a men whose upper bound for his reser-
vation type falls from t to t
Rg




























(f(twjth)   g(twjth))dtw  0 (A-16)
Together, the above two inequalities implies that the distribution pre- and post-policy
intersects at least once. This means that by continuity, there would exist t






w ] where the rst order stochastic dominance of the post-policy
distribution over that of the pre-policy reverses its dominance relationship. That is we will
not be able to establish a dominance relationship for the entire range of tw. In fact this
is the case for all th 2 [t; e tg]. This same problem arises when we compare the distribution
of spousal type across husbands' type within a cohort or year.
The same issue occurs even if we attempt to establish a second order dominance
relationship. If the post-policy distribution of spousal type second order dominates that









(G(twjth)   F(twjth))dtw  0 (A-17)
for 8t1;t 2 [t;t], and where F(:) and G(:) are the pre- and post-policy distribution func-






















Note that the rst term on the left hand side of equation (A-18) is positive, while the sec-




w ] will aect whether we
46see second order dominance for th 2 [t; e tg]. Particularly, we know that the two distribution
will intersect at least once. Without loss of generality, suppose the pre- and post-policy































where (twjth) = F(twjth)   G(twjth). It should be clear that what occurs would be
dependent on the relative demand and supply of spouses at every type realization. Intu-
itively, if the change in density at the upper bound of the reservation spousal type leads
to an increased density towards the right tail of the new density, it would be more likely
to nd higher order stochastic dominance. However, if the supply of potential partners
is low, this would be unlikely, reducing the likelihood of seeing higher order stochastic
dominance.
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